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A Pension Plan Incorporating Both Defined Benefit 
and Defined Contribution Principles 
M. Zaki Khorasanee* 
Abstract t 
We propose a defined contribution pension plan with an explicitly defined 
benefit formula. Such a plan is expected to pay more stable and predictable 
benefits over time than one based on the money purchase principle. The prop-
erties of the plan are investigated through simulation. Methods for distributing 
surpluses and eliminating deficiencies that involve adjusting the rate of ben-
efit accrual (rather than varying the rate of contribution) are discussed. The 
behavior of the plan under a scenario of persistently unfavorable investment 
experience is Simulated, and methods for satisfactorily dealing with such a sce-
nario are considered. The plan actuary is expected to play an important role 
in maintaining an appropriate balance between solvency and stability. 
Key words and phrases: money purchase plan, Simulation, equity index, invest-
ment 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Defined Contribution Plans 
Defined contribution pension plans 1 are growing in popularity in 
the United Kingdom (U.K.). In countries such as the U.S.A. and Australia 
*M. Zaki Khorasanee, B.A., F.I.A., is a lecturer in the Department of Actuarial Science 
and Statistics at City University, England. He obtained his B.A. degree in 1985 from 
Cambridge University and has worked for six years as a pension actuary with various 
consulting firms in, the London area. 
Mr. Khorasanee's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, City 
University, Northampton Square, London ECl V OHB, England. Internet address: 
m.z.khorasanee@city.ac.uk 
tThe author would like to acknowledge the help of his colleague Professor Steven 
Haberman whose comments on earlier drafts of this paper have improved both the 
presentation and content of the final version. 
1 A pension plan (U.S.A. and Canada) is termed a pension scheme in the U.K. 
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such plans are being established by employers of all sizes. The principal 
advantages to the sponsoring employer of a defined contribution plan, 
compared with a defined benefit plan, are: 
• Stable contributions, normally a fixed percentage of the pension-
able payroll; 
• No risk of insolvency, thus no possibility that the plan can repre-
sent a liability for the employer; 
• Freedom from compliance with legislation aimed at defined ben-
efit plans. 
The risks associated with poor investment performance are trans-
ferred to employees, who no longer can rely on their employers to pay 
additional contributions in order to support a fixed benefit scale. Thus, 
a report commissioned by the U.K. government (1993) recommends 
that active members of defined contribution plans should appoint at 
least two-thirds of the trustees. Although this proportion was reduced 
to one third in subsequent legislation, the logic of allowing members 
to assume responsibility for the assets of a defined contribution plan 
seems inescapable, as members are the ones who will bear the adverse 
consequences of any mismanagement of assets. 
1.2 Money Purchase Approach 
Will a rational group of employees want its defined contribution plan 
to run on the money purchase principle?2 Although this is the approach 
normally taken, it involves a considerable degree of investment risk for 
individual members, given that: 
• Equities generally are accepted as the most suitable asset class for 
long-term savings because they are believed to be a hedge against 
inflation and because they are expected to provide superior re-
turns to other assets; and 
• The return from equities has been, and probably will continue 
to be, highly variable, so the fund accumulated by an individual 
member will depend greatly on whether his or her period of mem-
bership happens to coincide with a period of favorable or unfa-
vorable investment experience. 
2In most defined contribution plans each member's accumulation of benefit is di-
rectly linked to the return on the assets of the fund over the same member's period of 
service. This is sometimes called the money purchase principle. 
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A comparison by Bodie (1989) based on historic U.K. investment and 
earnings data for a money purchase plan in which contributions of 10 
percent of earnings were invested in ordinary shares shows that the 
pension of an employee with 20 years of service retiring in one of the 
years from 1970 to 1987 would have varied between 13 percent and 41 
percent of final salary. 
1.3 Defined Benefit Approach 
Most defined benefit plans provide benefits based on employee re-
muneration. This satisfies the salutary objective of providing the pen-
sioner an income commensurate ·with that received while working. 
The most common benefit formula grants a fixed fraction of final 
salary for each year of service with the sponsoring employer. This for-
mula directly links income received immediately before and after re-
tirement; however, anomalies can arise if employees are subject to un-
usually large changes in salary close to retirement. Some pension plans 
have dealt with this problem by adopting a benefit formula based on 
career average salary, where each salary figure is increased on an index 
of wage or price inflation over the period to retirement. 
One of the most important features of these plans compared with 
money purchase plans is the reduction in benefit uncertainty for indi-
vidual members, especially if benefits are measured in real rather than 
in nominal terms. Real salary increases are much less variable than 
are real investment returns. This reduction in benefit uncertainty is 
possible because of two characteristics of defined benefit plans: 
• The sponsoring employer varies the rate of contribution in accor-
dance with the financial position of the fund; 
• Surpluses and deficits arising from investment volatility are tol-
erated, effectively smoothing volatile investment returns between 
different generations of employees. 
Although the first characteristic cannot, by definition, be part of a de-
fined contribution plan, there is no reason why the second characteris-
tic should not be. Thus, some defined contribution plans operate with 
an investment reserve, in order to smooth out variability in benefits 
for retiring members. The objective of this paper is to examine one 
possible way of running such a plan, in which elements of the defined 
benefit approach are adopted. 
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1.4 Integrating Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution 
Approaches 
We examine the possibility of operating an integrated plan, i.e., a 
defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale. In this case 
the defined benefit scale is linked to career average revalued salary. 
Such a benefit scale represents the ultimate smoothing of investment 
returns. Carr (1988) observes that a defined benefit scale based on 
career average revalued salary is similar to a money purchase plan in 
which each member's fund accumulates at the same real rate of interest. 
This integrated plan deviates from the pure defined benefit approach 
in one important respect: the rate of benefit accrual will vary, its value 
depending on the current surplus/deficit of fund assets over accrued 
liabilities. Thus, the response to a deficit is to reduce the accrual rate 
for future service (rather than to increase the contribution rate as in a 
pure defined benefit plan). Moderate surpluses can be tolerated as a 
safety margin against future adverse experience; an excessive surplus 
is handled through a fixed percentage increase in the accrued benefits 
of existing members. 
To my knowledge, no integrated pension plan based on the princi-
ples described above exists. As such, this paper examines the feasibility 
of the proposed plan solely from an actuarial viewpoint. Only when the 
merits and demerits of the plan on actuarial grounds have been consid-
ered would it be appropriate to consider legislative concerns. 
2 The Model Pension Plan 
2.1 Main Characteristics 
Our model integrated plan has the follOwing properties: 
• A single member at each age from 25 to 64 inclusive; 
• The same fixed pensionable salary for each member; 
• An employer contribution for each member of one unit3 per an-
num, paid annually in advance; 
• No employee contributions; 
• No mortality before age 65; 
3We use currency units adjusted for wage inflation. It follows that the fixed contri-
bution per member is effectively a fixed proportion of salary. 
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• All members who leave service before retirement are replaced by 
new entrants of identical age and salary; 
• All retirements occur at age 65; 
• Each active member retiring at age 65 is replaced by a new entrant 
age 25. 
In addition, the following notation is used throughout the paper: 
S(x, t) 
B(x, t) 
rna 
a(t) 
bt 
B(t) 
AL(t) 
SF(t) 
SR(t) 
FR(t) 
F(t) 
D(t) 
AVRF 
Annual pensionable salary over next year of 
a member age x at time t; 
Accrued lump sum benefit, payable at age 65, 
of a member age x at time t; 
Target fraction of career average earnings per year of 
pensionable service; 
Additional benefit awarded to each member for each unit 
of benefit accrued at time t; 
Fraction of target accrual rate applied during [t, t + 1); 
Benefit outgo of plan at time t; 
Value of accrued liabilities at time t; 
Entry age normal standard fund at time t; 
Solvency ratio at time t; 
Funding ratio at time t; 
Market value of fund at time t; 
Equity index dividend yield at time t; 
Average return on fund over all t; 
Actuarial return on the assets during [t, t + 1); 
Return on market value of assets during [t, t + 1); 
Return on equity index during [t, t + 1); 
Interest rate assumed by actuary; and 
1/(1 + 0. 
2.2 Benefit at Retirement 
We assume that a lump sum benefit, equal to some fraction of ca-
reer average salary for each year of pensionable service, is paid on re-
tirement. The lump sum retirement benefit accrues in the following 
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way: 
B(x + I, t + 1) = (1 + a(t)B(x, t) + mobts(x, t). (1) 
Equation (1) defines the principle on which our proposed plan is 
based. It is a career average salary plan with a fixed target rate of 
accrual, but the parameters a(t) and b t can be used to vary both the 
benefits accrued from past senice and the future rate of accrual in a 
manner appropriate to the financial position of the plan at time t. The 
plan can be described as a variable defined benefit plan. 
Under ideal conditions a(t) is always equal to zero and bt is always 
equal to one; equation (1) then simplifies to: 
B(x + I, t + 1) = B(x, t) + mos(x, t), 
which represents a pure defined benefit plan in which all members re-
ceive the same fraction of career average salary for each year of pen-
sionable service. In practice, both a(t) and bt would need to be varied 
from time to time to accommodate the variable investment experience 
of the plan. 
In our model plan each member has the same fixed pensionable 
salary, so we can write: 
We now define: 
Bo 
n(x, t) 
s(x, t) = so. 
40moso 
B(x, t)/(moso). 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Bo is the target benefit of a member retiring with 40 years service, 
and n(x, t) is the effective pensionable service of the member age x at 
time t. It follows from equations (1) to (4) that: 
n(x + I, t + 1) 
B(x,t) 
(1 + a(t)n(x,t) + bt 
Bo 
40 n(x, t). 
(5) 
(6) 
Equations (5) and (6) will be used to project the liabilities of our plan. 
2.3 Benefit on Withdrawal 
Members who leave service before retirement would receive a de-
ferred lump sum, payable at age 65, based on the accrued benefit at 
the time employment ends. Although such individuals would not ac-
crue benefits after leaving, it may be reasonable for them to continue 
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to share in any future distributions of surplus before they retire. Thus, 
equations (5) and (6), Vl1th bt set to zero, would continue to apply for 
deferred pensioners. 
As this withdrawal benefit is revalued in line with wage inflation 
between the date of leaving and retirement, it is no different from the 
benefit that would have accrued for the same period of service had the 
member stayed in the plan until age 65. As we have assumed that all 
those who leave early are replaced by new entrants of the same age 
and salary, it follows that withdrawals before retirement have no effect 
on the plan. The total benefits paid to those who leave early and their 
replacements would be the same as those received by a single member 
who stays in the plan until retirement. 
2.4 Discontinuance Benefits 
If the plan is wound up, there would be no obligation for the em-
ployer to cover any shortfall in the assets relative to the accrued liabil-
ities, and it is unlikely that buying out liabilities linked to future wage 
inflation would be an option. The logical course of action is to pay each 
member an immediate transfer value, dividing the assets of the fund in 
proportion to the value of each member's accrued benefits. Hence, the 
amount of each transfer value would be given by: 
Transfer Value = Solvency Ratio x B(x, t)V65 - X (7) 
where v is the annual discount factor based on the assumed valuation 
interest rate, and the solvency ratio is the market value of the assets 
divided by the total value of the accrued benefits. 
Although the question of solvency cover is not a problem for the 
employer, it is of considerable importance to members, who run the 
risk of having their benefits scaled back if the plan is wound up. 
2.5 Investment Strategy 
In Pension Fund Indicators '96, the U.K.-based fund manager PDFM4 
quotes a figure of 77 percent of total U.K. pension fund assets being 
invested in equities at the end of 1995. This figure is an average-one 
would expect the equity content of any particular fund to depend of 
the mean term of its liabilities and the proportion of its liabilities that 
are real rather than nominal. Thus, as a general rule, the smaller the 
4philips & Drew Fund Management Limited (PDFM), 10 Broadgate, Liverpool Street, 
London EC2M 2RH, United Kingdom. 
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number of pensioners in a pension plan, the greater the asset allocation 
to equities. 
Given that there are no pensioner liabilities in our proposed plan 
and all the deferred pensioner liabilities are indexed in line with wages, 
we assume the fund is 100 percent invested in U.K. equities. It can be 
argued that part of the fund should be invested in government stocks 
to reduce volatility in returns. Such a reduction in volatility could be 
at the expense of lower average returns and, therefore, lower average 
benefits. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether a defined con-
tribution plan can reduce the variability in the benefit payout without 
reducing either the average benefit payout or volatility in investment 
returns. 
3 Formulae for Simulations 
3.1 Actuarial Valuation 
There is no question that the model plan we have described would 
require periodic actuarial valuations, as does any defined benefit plan. 
The purpose of such valuations would be to: 
• Determine the ratio of the assets of the plan to both the value 
of the accrued benefits and to the standard fund of our chosen 
funding method; and 
• Recommend, if judged appropriate, a distribution of surplus or a 
change in the rate of benefit accrual. 
Two interesting questions not considered are whether the solvency of 
the plan should require legal certification and whether the trustees 
should have the right to refuse the actuary's advice. We assume here 
that the plan is run in accordance v.ith the actuary's recommendations. 
3.2 Standard FundS 
Should the standard fund for our integrated plan simply be the value 
of the accrued benefits? As the accrued benefits are indexed in line with 
earnings, such a standard fund would be consistent with the projected 
SThe term standard fund is the U.K. terminology for the target level of assets for any 
particular funding method. 
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unit credit method, a commonly used funding method for large defined 
benefit plans. 
The projected unit credit method is not prudent for our plan, how-
ever, because it requires an increasing rate of contribution for an ag-
ing membership. Because our plan is a defined contribution plan, a 
projected unit credit standard fund would have insufficient assets to 
meet the projected benefits of the existing members should the plan 
be closed to new entrants. 
The standard fund of the entry age normal method is appropriate 
for our plan because: 
• It would have sufficient assets to meet the projected benefits if 
the plan were closed to new entrants; and 
• No strain arises if new entrants above the selected entry age are 
matched by withdrawing members of the same age and salary. 
The second characteristic arises because a withdrawing member pro-
duces a release of reserve under the entry age normal method that 
matches the strain created by a new entrant of the same age and salary. 
As we have assumed that new entrants and withdrawals are matched 
in this way, they can safely be ignored in our simulations. In practice 
we may have a growing plan in which there are excess new entrants 
entering at ages above the assumed entry age (age 25 for our plan). 
This problem could be resolved by requiring such individuals to serve 
a nonpensionable waiting period, during which time the employer con-
tributions paid on their behalf would offset the strain on the fund. 
3.3 Derivation of Formulae 
We assume that all benefit payments from and contributions to the 
plan are made at annual intervals coinciding with the date of retirement 
of the oldest member. The target benefit, Bo, is set by the actuary: 
Bo = 5401 at rate i. (8) 
The benefit outgo in any year is the lump sum paid to the retiring mem-
ber, hence: 
Bo B(t) = B(65, t) = 40 n(65, t). 
The accrued liabilities and standard fund are given by: 
64 B _ 
= 2: ~n(x, t)v 6 :>-x 
X=25 40 
AL(t) (9) 
278 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.2, 1995 
64 
SF(t) = L (:~[n(X,t)+65-X]V65-X-a65_XI)' (10) 
x=25 
The market value of the fund is given by the recurrence formula: 
F(t + 1) = (F(t) + 40)(1 + jd - B(t + 1). (ll) 
3.4 Solvency and Funding Ratios 
The solvency ratio is a measure of the capacity of the pension plan's 
assets to cover its accrued liabilities on an immediate wind-up of the 
plan, thus: 
SR(t) = F(t)/AL(t). 
Clearly, large values of SR(t) are desirable. 
The funding ratio, on the' other hand, concerns the extent to which 
the standard fund is covered by assets. In actuarial valuations of U.K. 
defined benefit plans it is customary to use a discounted cash flow 
value for the assets rather than their market value, because this tends 
to smooth market fluctuations. This is a highly desirable objective for 
our plan, as the actuary would wish to avoid recommending benefit 
changes as a result of short-term movements in the equity market. 
Accordingly, we define Fa (t) to be the actuarial value of fund at 
time t; and do to be the par dividend yield. As the fund is 100 percent 
invested in U.K. equities, its actuarial value is: 
Fa(t) D(t)F(t) / do (12) 
and 
FR(t) Fa (t) / SR(t). (13) 
3.5 Money Purchase Plan 
We compare the benefit outgo of our plan with that of a money pur-
chase plan subject to the same investment experience. For the money 
purchase plan, we define f m (x, t) to be the fund accumulated by mem-
ber age x at time t and Bm (t) to be the benefit outgo at time t of the 
money purchase plan. If follows that: 
f m (x + 1, t + 1) 
Bm(t) 
(l + fm(x, t))(l + jd 
fm (65, t). 
(14) 
(15) 
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4 Deterministic Simulations Using Investment and 
Earnings Data 
In this section we simulate the progress of our plan using U.K. equity 
returns and wage inflation from 1950 to 1994. Equity returns prior to 
1963 are taken from the BZW Equity Index6 and thenceforth from the 
FT-SE-A All-Share Index. 7 Wage inflation is based on the annual increase 
in the most representative index of U.K. average earnings available at 
the time, as published by the Government Statistical Service (1993). 
4.1 Initial Assumptions 
The target benefit offered by the plan depends on the assumption 
used by the plan actuary for equity returns net of pay increases. The 
average net return on the U.K. equity index, using actuarial values, is 
roughly 4 percent per annum from 1950 to 1994. 
We assume that: 
• The actuary sets net interest at 3 percent per annum; and 
• Each member initially has pensionable service n(x, 0) = x - 25. 
Thus, from equations (8), (9), and (10) we can determine that Bo = 77.7 
units, AL(O) = 1048 units, and SF(O) = 1215 units. 
The equity index dividend yield at the start of 1950 was 5 percent, 
which is roughly equal to the average figure from 1950 to 1994. We 
therefore assume the par dividend yield to be 5 percent, in which case 
the market value of the assets initially will be the same as the actuarial 
value. We also assume the plan starts with a funding ratio of 100 per-
cent, thus: F(O) = 1215 units, FR(O) = 100 percent, and SR(O) = 116 
percent. 
For comparison with a money purchase plan, we assume that: 
• The money purchase plan starts with the same assets as our plan 
and follows the same investment strategy; 
• Each member's initial fund is equal to the entry age normal reserve 
at 3 percent interest. 
6The BZW equity index is a representath'e stock price index for ordinary shares 
traded in the United Kingdom. This index is compiled by the investment bank BarcJays 
de Zoete Wedd (hence BZW). 
7The FT-SE-A All-Share index is the most representative U.K. stock price index since 
1963. It is published by the London Financial Times and is jointly compiled by the 
London Stock Exchange and the Institute of Actuaries. 
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4.2 Fixed Defined Benefit Scale 
We first examine what would happen to the plan if it maintained a 
fixed benefit outgo regardless of its investment experience (as for a true 
defined benefit plan), i.e., a(t) = 0 and bt = 1 for t ~ O. We examine 
three different scenarios: 
• Case A: jt = et and AVRF= i + 0.01; 
• Case B: jt = et - 0.01 and A VRF = i; and 
• Case C: jt = et - 0.02 and AvRF = i - 0.01. 
The simulated solvency and funding ratios of the plan are shown in 
Figure 1. Part (a) of Figure 1 shows the effect of the average investment 
return exceeding the actuary's initial assumption by approximately 1 
percent per annum over the 45 year period. The funding surplus re-
mains within reasonable bounds until the early 1980s, at which point it 
rises rapidly (from 32 percent of the standard fund in 1982 to 174 per-
cent of the standard fund in 1995). The solvency ratio, derived from the 
market value of the assets, is more volatile (falling to 49 percent after 
the stock market crash of 1974-1975). The favorable investment expe-
rience of the 1980s and 1990s results in the solvency cover exceeding 
400 percent in 1994. 
Part (b) of Figure 1 shows how the plan behaves when the investment 
experience is roughly consistent with the initial 3 percent assumption; 
thus, the funding surplus after 45 years is only 22 percent of the stan-
dard fund. The solvency ratio is below 100 percent over the eight year 
period from 1975 to 1983, but ends at 176 percent. 
Part (c) of Figure 1 shows the effect of investment returns averaging 
only 2 percent per annum, 1 percent below the actuary's assumption. 
The funding and solvency ratios stay within reasonable bounds until the 
early 1970s, when the plan goes heavily into deficit and never recovers. 
It is only the favorable investment experience of the 1980s and 1990s 
that prevents the fund from running out of assets altogether. 
These simulations show that a defined contribution plan cannot in-
definitely operate with a fixed defined benefit scale unless the actuary 
can predict average investment returns with considerable accuracy. The 
past experience has shown us a difference of 1 percent per annum be-
tween assumed and actual investment returns results in an untenable 
position within 40 years. As no actuary can be confident of predicting 
the average return to the required degree of accuracy, a variable benefit 
scale responding to changes in the funding and solvency positions is 
necessary. 
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Figure 1 
Fixed Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios 
Part (a): actual return = assumed return + 1 % 
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4.3 Variable Defined Benefit Scale 
Our variable defined benefit scale involves assigning values to aCt) 
other than zero and values to bt other than one. Davies (1991) com-
ments that a function of surplus in defined benefit plans is to act as 
a margin against future unfayorable experience. This criterion is even 
more valid for a defined contribution plan attempting to follow a de-
fined benefit scale, as the employer has no obligation to support the 
benefit scale with additional contributions. Thus, a fairly large fund-
ing surplus is desirable as a margin; perhaps only surpluses above this 
funding margin should be distributed. We arbitrarily select a funding 
margin of 50 percent of the standard fund, thus: 
FR(t) 
aCt) = max { 1.5 - 1, O}. (16) 
A solvency ratio of less than 100 percent is a matter for serious con-
cern, particularly as the required fund for solvency purposes would be 
significantly lower than the standard fund. It seems likely that most of 
the members would agree to a temporary suspension of benefit accrual 
in order to restore the plan to financial health. Thus, the suggested 
formula for bt is: 
{
I if SR(t) ~ 100% 
b t = 0 if SR(t) < 100%. (17) 
The progress of the plan is simulated for the three investment sce-
narios. Figure 2 shows the values of aCt) and bt from 1950 to 1994; 
Figure 3 shows the solvency and funding ratios; and Figure 4 compares 
the benefit outgo of the variable defined benefit plan with that of a 
money purchase plan subject to the same funding and investment ex-
perience. 
As expected, the favorable investment scenario, Case A, results in 
the largest and most frequent distributions of surplus (when aCt) > 0), 
while benefit accrual is suspended only during the crash of 1974-1975 
(when b t = 0). Under the unfavorable investment scenario, Case C, 
there is no distribution of surplus (a(t) is always zero), and benefit 
accrual is suspended for 13 consecutive years from 1972 to 1984. 
Figure 3 shows that in all three scenarios the solvency and funding 
ratios follow a remarkably similar pattern. In each case a healthy, but 
reasonable, funding surplus emerges after 45 years, and the solvency 
ratio ends at approximately 200 percent. 
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Figure 2 
Variable Defined Benefits: a(t) and bt 
Part (a): actual return = assumed return + 1 % 
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Figure 3 
Variable Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios 
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Figure 4 is the most important one for judging whether the variable 
defined benefit plan has any advantages over a money purchase plan. 
Figure 4 shows that our proposed plan provides more stable benefits 
over time. In each case the variable defined benefit outgo is a trend 
line through the money purchase outgo, and sharp variations in benefit 
payments from year to year are avoided. 
5 Stochastic Simulations 
The deterministic simulations of the previous section show us how 
the variable defined benefit plan behaves when equity returns follow a 
similar pattern to those experienced from 1950 to 1994. The benefit 
outgo of our plan is more stable from year to year than that of a money 
purchase plan. 
We have yet to establish whether the projected retirement fund of 
an active member of our plan is less variable than in a money purchase 
plan. This question can only be answered adequately through simula-
tions using a stochastic model for equity returns net of wage inflation. 
5.1 Stochastic Model for Equity Returns 
Recall that rt is the actuarial return on the assets: 
(1 + idD(t + 1) - D(t) 
rt = D(t) . (18) 
Let us assume that the actuarial returns form a" sequence of indepen-
dent, identically-distributed, log-normal random variables. Historical 
annual data from 1950 to 1994 yield the estimate for the standard de~ 
viation ofln[1 + rtl as 0.0675. 
Next we consider how to model the equity dividend yield time series. 
Wilkie (1986) observes that the average dividend yield on U.K. equities 
has tended to vary about a long-term average and that yields in adja-
cent periods exhibit significant positive correlation. This implies that 
the U.K. equity market has tended to correct itself when overvalued or 
undervalued by historic standards, which has important implications 
for the variability in funds accumulated over long periods. 
Wilkie uses a first order autoregressive formula for the logarithm 
of the equity dividend yield and assumes that past price inflation had 
a direct effect on yields. Because we require a model that operates in 
real values, we ignore the latter feature of Wilkie's model and use the 
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following formula: 
In[D(t)] = (1 - k)J.1d + kln[D(t)] + (J"dNt.Jl - k 2 (19) 
where Nt is the standard normal random variable with mean zero and 
unit variance, and k, J.1d, and (J"d are parametric constants. The following 
estimates for the parameters are obtained from historic data from 1950 
to 1994: k = 0.5, J.1d = -3.0, and (J"d = 0.24. 
5.2 Initial Assumptions 
One thousand independent simulations are performed for both the 
variable defined benefit plan and the money purchase plan, so that 
values for the projected retirement fund of members at different initial 
ages are obtained for both types of plan. 
The initial assumptions are as above: Bo is based on a net interest 
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x,O) = x - 25; a(t) and b t 
are determined as in equations (16) and (17); and j(x, 0) = entry age 
normal reserve at 3 percent net interest. For the stochastic investment 
model, we assume additionally that D(O) = 5 percent and the mean of 
In[1 + rtJ is In(l.03). 
5.3 Dependence of Results on Initial Conditions 
A problem with simulations for the variable defined benefit plan 
is that the expected fund at retirement (and also, to some degree, its 
variability) depends on the initial funding and solvency ratios. 
We start with a funding ratio of 100 percent. Given the methods 
used for determining a(t) and b t , however, the expected funding ratio 
at any future time is likely to be greater than 100 percent. In the money 
purchase plan there is no similar tendency to build surplus assets. It 
follows that for these particular simulations the mean benefit obtained 
at retirement will be lower for the variable defined benefit plan than 
for the money purchase plan. This will not be true in general, however, 
because for future new entrants to the variable defined benefit plan the 
funding ratio is as likely to rise as to fall over their period of service. 
Also, in the variable defined benefit plan it seems likely that the 
variability of the benefit paid at retirement will depend on the size of 
the initial fund. Perhaps this variability would be greatest if the initial 
funding position of the plan were either very strong or very weak, as 
either a(t) or b t then would be more likely to deviate from its usual 
value. 
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In spite of the problems outlined above, we should still obtain some 
useful information from these simulations, particularly in relation to 
how the variability in the projected retirement benefit reduces as the 
member gets closer to retirement, which we term the narrowing funnel 
of doubt. 
5.4 Results of Stochastic Simulations 
Percentiles for the projected retirement benefit are obtained for both 
the variable defined benefit and money purchase plans for members ini-
tiallyage 25, 45, and 55 and are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
For each initial age the money purchase plan pays a higher median bene-
fit. This occurs because we chose an initial funding ratio of 100 percent 
for the variable defined benefit plan. There is no reason to believe that 
in the long term the median benefit paid by the two types of plan would 
differ significantly. To compare the variability of the projected benefit 
in each type of plan, we tabulate the ratio of the benefit at the 75th 
percentile to that at the 25th percentile; see Table 3. 
Table 1 
Percentiles for Variable Defined Benefit Plan 
Initial Percentile 
Age 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
25 46.6 60.2 71.8 92.0 142.2 
45 58.3 66.0 71.8 77.7 102.2 
55 66.0 69.9 73.8 75.7 78.0 
Table 2 
Percentiles for Money Purchase Plan 
Initial Percentile 
Age 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
25 43.8 62.3 79.8 104.7 151.7 
45 47.0 63.7 80.6 101.5 141.7 
55 47.8 63.4 76.7 95.6 129.9 
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Table 3 
Interquartile Ratio 
Initial Variable Money 
Age Defined Benefit Purchase 
25 1.53 1.68 
45 1.18 1.59 
55 1.08 1.51 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the projected benefit at retirement from the 
variable defined benefit plan is at all ages less variable than that from 
the money purchase plan. The difference in variability is not that great 
at age 25, but becomes more significant as the member nears retire-
ment. Thus, the funnel of doubt narrows more quickly in the variable 
defined benefit plan. Members of the variable defined benefit plan will 
have less need to switch their fund to low risk assets on approaching 
retirement, as normally would be recommended in a money purchase 
arrangement. 
The narrowing funnel of doubt also means that a member of the 
variable defined benefit plan will have more advance warning of a sub-
standard benefit at retirement. We can see how this could occur: a 
member who had experienced a period of nil accrual or was currently 
serving in such a period would have a reduced benefit expectation. The 
advantage of such foresight is that it gives the member an incentive to 
make additional provision for retirement. 
5.5 Effect of a Lower Funding Margin 
We have somewhat arbitrarily assumed that our variable defined 
benefit plan would operate with a funding margin of 50 percent, so 
that only surpluses in excess of this margin would be distributed. In 
practice a margin of this size may not be permitted by legislation. We 
now examine the consequences of using a lower funding margin to de-
termine whether the variable defined benefit plan can operate as effec-
tively under such a regime. 
Using the same stochastic model for equity returns, 1000 simula-
tions are made for the variable defined benefit plan assuming that all 
surpluses in excess of a funding ratio of 125 percent are distributed 
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immediately. All other initial assumptions are as before. The results of 
the simulations are shown in Table 4. 
In Table 5 we tabulate the interquartile ratios, comparing the results 
with those obtained for the variable defined benefit plan using a 50 
percent funding margin. The increase in variability caused by reducing 
the funding margin to 25 percent is not particularly large. The possible 
effect on the results of using an initial funding ratio of 100 percent, 
however, should be borne in mind. 
Table 4 
Percentiles for a 25 Percent Funding Margin 
Initial 
Age 
25 
45 
55 
5th 
46.6 
56.7 
66.0 
Initial 
Age 
25 
45 
55 
6 Ruin Scenarios 
Percentile 
25th 50th 75th 
60.5 73.7 93.7 
67.2 74.3 87.5 
71.8 74.1 78.2 
Table 5 
Interquartile Ratio 
Funding Margin 
95th 
130.2 
116.2 
92.5 
50 Percent 25 Percent 
1.53 
1.18 
1.08 
1.55 
1.30 
1.09 
6.1 Effect of Poor Investment Experience 
Thus far we have shown that our plan could cope with investment 
returns 1 percent lower than assumed by the actuary. Part (c) of Figure 
3 shows that the plan ends with a comfortable funding surplus after 45 
years, at the price of having to suspend accrual of benefits from 1972 
to 1984. (See Part (c) of Figure 2.) 
Khorasanee: Pension Plan 291 
We now turn our attention to more extreme situations, in which 
even the suspension of accrual is not sufficient to restore the plan to 
solvency. Our plan cannot, by definition, be insolvent following a wind-
up because the benefits payable in such an event are shares of the re-
maining fund. It is theoretically possible, however, that the plan could 
exhaust its assets while still in operation, resulting in insufficient cash 
flow to pay the benefits promised to retiring members. There are two 
factors that might lead to such a situation: 
• Extremely and persistently poor investment returns; 
• Moderately poor investment returns combined with a declining 
number of active members. 
A declining number of active members would lead to declining contri-
bution income from the employer, making it more difficult to restore 
the plan to a satisfactory position by suspending the accrual of benefits. 
6.2 Stationary Active Member Population 
Assume that, as in previous simulations, our plan has a stationary 
population of active members and that Eo is based on a net interest 
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x, 0) = x - 25; and a(t) and 
b t are determined as in equations (16) and (17). 
We simulate the progress of the plan for the following investment 
scenarios: 
l. jt "" et - 0.04; and 
2. jt = et - 0.10. 
Scenario (1) implies an average return net of wage inflation of 0 percent 
per annum, whereas scenario (2) implies an average net return of -6 
percent per annum. Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations. 
Part (a) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the assets of the 
plan reach a low point after the stock market crash of 1974-1975. In 
scenario 2 the assets fall close to zero in 1975, but the plan recovers in 
the following years. 
Part (b) of Figure 5 shows that the benefit outgo falls in both scenar-
ios. In scenario 2 the poor investment experience results in the contin-
uous suspension of accrual from 1951 to 1985; thus, the benefit outgo 
falls more steeply compared with scenario l. An important threshold is 
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attained when the benefit outgo falls below 40 units, the annual contri-
bution income from the employer. At this point the plan is assured of 
having sufficient cash flow to pay future benefits. Thus, provided that 
the plan has survived to this threshold, there is no longer an immediate 
risk of ruin. Significantly, in scenario 2 the benefit outgo falls below 40 
units shortly before the stock market crash of 1974-1975. 
Part (c) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the solvency ratio 
falls to a low point after the 1974-1975 crash and recovers strongly 
over the following decade. In scenario 2 there is a brief period in the 
early 1980s when the solvency ratio explodes: reaching a maximum 
value of 910 percent at the start of 1985. This occurs because the 
accrued liabilities of the plan have fallen to a low figure as a result of 
the suspension of accrual of benefits for over 30 years. The solvency 
ratio of 910 percent is accompanied by a funding ratio of only 127 
percent, illustrating the suitability of the entry age normal method for 
plans with small accrued liabilities. 
These simulations show that the risk of ruin from poor investment 
experience is not much of a problem, provided that the number of ac-
tive members (and therefore the contribution income) does not decline. 
Even if investment returns average 6 percent per annum below wage in-
flation (a pessimistic scenario) and returns are as variable as those over 
the past 45 years (including the unusually severe crash of 1974-1975) 
our plan would have avoided ruin. 
Ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations obtained using 
the stochastic model for equity returns described above. One hundred 
simulations are made for various different combinations of the mean of 
the log-normal distribution for rt and the initial solvency ratio. For the 
plan to avoid ruin, we require that F (t) > 0 for all t > O. The number 
of occasions on which the plan fails to avoid ruin over each run of 100 
simulations is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Ruin Frequency 
Stationary Active Member Population 
Average Return on'Fund (A VRF) 
SR(O) 0% -1% -2% -3% -4% -5% -6% -7% -8% 
1.00 0 0 1 1 1 1 17 42 71 
0.75 0 0 2 2 3 14 31 59 73 
0.50 1 7 28 41 56 83 89 99 100 
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As before, ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations ob-
tained using the stochastic model for equity returns described earlier, 
each run consisting of 100 simulations. The results are displayed in 
Table 7. 
Table 7 
Ruin Frequency 
Declining Active Member Population 
Average Return on Fund 
SR(O) 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 
1.50 73 34 20 5 0 
1.00 90 72 45 21 6 
0.50 98 89 67 44 30 
The frequencies obtained again appear broadly consistent with the 
results of the deterministic simulations. Even when the initial solvency 
ratio is 100 percent and the average net investment return is 3 percent 
per annum (in line with the actuary's assumption), the estimated prob-
ability of ruin is as high as 0.21. Furthermore, a high initial solvency 
ratio of 150 percent does not seem to offer much additional protec-
tion; the estimated probability of ruin is still as high as 0.20 when the 
average investment return is only 1 percent below that assumed by the 
actuary. 
6.4 Avoiding Ruin 
When we have a stationary population of active members, invest-
ment returns have to be poor for our plan to run out of money. Unless 
the average return falls below the actuary's assumption by around 9 
percent per annum, the suspension of accrual appears to be a strong 
enough remedy to restore the plan to solvency. Once the benefit outgo 
of the plan falls below the contribution income, the possibility of ruin 
disappears. 
The main problem with the above approach is dissatisfaction among 
active members if it appears that the accrual of benefits has been sus-
pended for an indefinite period. It is essential that our proposed plan 
requires no member contributions, in order to reduce the likelihood 
that a large proportion of the active members would leave the plan if 
beaefit accrual were suspended. 
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Another option would be to seek the consent of the members for 
their accrued benefits to be scaled back in proportion to the solvency 
deficit and for accrual to continue at a somewhat lower rate than before. 
In such a situation there would be a clear conflict of interest between 
members with different amounts of past service; those with long past 
service would have most to lose from the accrued benefits being uni-
formly scaled back, whereas younger members potentially would have 
most to gain by the restoration of benefit accrual. The actuary would 
play an important role here in suggesting a suitable compromise; the 
solvency deficit could be eliminated partly by a cut in the accrued ben-
efits and partly by fixing the rate of benefit accrual at a low level for a 
temporary period. 
When the active member population of the plan is declining, the risk 
of ruin is more serious. In this situation the contribution income of the 
plan is falling in relation to the accrued liabilities, so the suspension of 
accrual is less effective in restoring the plan to solvency. 
Allowing the plan to run out of money is unacceptable, as the re-
maining active members would be left with no benefits at all at the 
expense of those who had been lucky enough to retire (or take transfer 
values) earlier. The plan would have to be wound-up, or converted to 
a pure money purchase arrangement, before the risk of ruin became 
too great. Ideally, this would be done when the solvency ratio was still 
above 100 percent. 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the feasibility of running 
a defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale that could be 
varied to accommodate unpredictable and volatile investment returns. 
The progress of a simple model plan, paying a benefit linked to ca-
reer average revalued salary, has been simulated. These simulations 
include both deterministic projections based on U.K. investment and 
earnings data taken from 1950 to 1994 and projections obtained using 
a stochastic model for equity returns. It has been shown that: 
• In order to maintain a fixed defined benefit scale over the period 
the actuary would have had to predict the average investment re-
turn net of wage inflation to an unrealistic degree of accuracy; 
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• A plan in which the benefit scale is varied when the size of the 
fund falls outside a central corridor can accommodate differences 
between actual and assumed investment returns and can maintain 
reasonable funding and solvency ratios for returns as variable as 
those experienced over the period; 
• The benefit payout of this variable defined benefit plan is more 
stable over time than that of a money purchase plan subject to 
the same volatile investment returns; 
• The uncertainty in the projected benefit payout of the variable 
defined benefit plan is less than in a money purchase plan and 
reduces more quickly as a member approaches retirement; 
• Provided that the number of acth'e members is not declining, the 
risk of ruin due to poor investment experience is small for the 
variable defined benefit plan; and 
• If the number of active members is declining, the risk of ruin 
becomes increasingly significant for the variable defined benefit 
plan, and the plan would need to be wound-up or converted to a 
money purchase arrangement. 
7.2 Comments on Plan Design 
Although the proposed integrated plan pays a benefit linked to ca-
reer average revalued salary, the same results would have been obtained 
for a final salary plan because we assume that each member's salary is 
fixed in units linked to general wage inflation. In the real world a ca-
reer average scale would have concrete advantages because the accrued 
liabilities would be less volatile when actual salary increases deviated 
from wage inflation. It is also arguable that a career average scale is 
better for members, as their benefits are affected less by variations in 
pay close to retirement. 
The proposed plan requires no member contributions, which seems 
to be an absolute necessity if the accrual of benefits is to be suspended 
(or severely curtailed) when the solvency ratio falls below a critical 
value. Mason (1993) outlines a simple method for converting a con-
tributory plan to a noncontributory plan at no cost to the employer. 
There are no pensioner liabilities, because we have assumed a lump 
sum benefit is provided at retirement. In practice the lump sum would 
be used to buy an immediate annuity from an insurance company. 
There are two good reasons why the plan should avoid retaining pen-
sioner liabilities, viz.: 
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• Retaining such liabilities would reduce the ratio of the contribu-
tion income to the accrued liabilities, making it more difficult to 
eliminate a solvency deficit by suspending the accrual of benefit 
and thus increasing the risk of ruin; and 
• Pensioners would seek representation on a trustee board, and 
their interests might conflict with those of the active members. 
The benefit on withdrawal from service is revalued in line with wage 
inflation. This ensures that the expected benefit at retirement is pro-
portional to the length of pensionable service, irrespective of when the 
member leaves the plan. Final salary plans give a lower benefit to those 
who leave early, because the rate of revaluation of deferred pensions 
is normally below wage inflation. A money purchase plan paying the 
same rate of contribution for all members favors younger entrants be-
cause their funds accumulate over longer periods compared with older 
entrants. It is reasonable to assume that a rational group of employees 
would prefer the equitable approach meted by a career average plan. 
7.3 Rules for Adjusting the Benefits 
The simple rules used for adjusting the benefit payout could be re-
fined to permit greater flexibility. For example, we have assumed that 
the whole of any surplus in excess of a 50 percent funding margin would 
be distributed immediately. Members retiring just before the funding 
ratio went above 150 percent might feel aggrieved. The actuary instead 
could recommend a sliding scale for surplus distributions. Similarly, if 
the solvency position of the plan were threatened, step-by-step reduc-
tions in the rate of accrual may be preferable to the complete suspen-
sion of accrual. Refinements of this kind could reduce the variability 
in the benefit payout of the plan. 
Explicit rules should exist for adjusting the benefit scale, rather 
than allowing a purely discretionary approach (as in a with-profit fund). 
Members are unlikely to enjoy having their benefits being determined 
by what they may perceive as the ,,,,him of the plan actuary. If the actu-
ary felt that any change in the rules were required, this could be put to 
the trustees. 
7.4 Role of the Plan Actuary 
There is little doubt that the plan actuary would have a vital role, 
possibly a more important role than in a traditional defined benefit 
plan. The members would depend on the advice of the actuary to: 
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• Agree on a suitable target benefit for their plan; 
• Decide on equitable methods for distributing surplus while re-
taining an adequate margin against possible unfavorable future 
experience; 
• Decide on equitable methods for keeping the plan solvent should 
investment returns be poorer than expected; 
• Take appropriate action if the risk of ruin had become unaccept-
able as a result of a decline in the number of active members. 
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